Cognition 108 (2):353-380 (2008)
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Abstract |
An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation and intentional action. We therefore suggest that the present finding favors the view that moral appraisal plays a pervasive role in shaping diverse cognitive representations across multiple domains.
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DOI | 10.1016/j.cognition.2008.02.005 |
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References found in this work BETA
The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment.Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Marc Hauser - 2006 - Psychological Science 17 (12):1082-1089.
Active and Passive Euthanasia.James Rachels - 1975 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press.
The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology.Joshua Knobe - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):203-231.
Acting Intentionally and the Side-Effect Effect: 'Theory of Mind' and Moral Judgment.Joshua Knobe, Adam Cohen & Alan Leslie - 2006 - Psychological Science 17:421-427.
Intuitions and Individual Differences: The Knobe Effect Revisited.Shaun Nichols & Joseph Ulatowski - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (4):346–365.
View all 11 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist.Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.
Graded Causation and Defaults.Joseph Y. Halpern & Christopher Hitchcock - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):413-457.
Do Men and Women Have Different Philosophical Intuitions? Further Data.Toni Adleberg, Morgan Thompson & Eddy Nahmias - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):615-641.
Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment.Fiery Cushman - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
View all 48 citations / Add more citations
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