Palgrave (2003)

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Jonathan Knowles argues against theories that seek to provide specific norms for the formation of belief on the basis of empirical sources: the project of naturalized epistemology. He argues that such norms are either not genuinely normative for belief, or are not required for optimal belief formation. An exhaustive classification of such theories is motivated and each variety is discussed in turn. He distinguishes naturalized epistemology from the less committal idea of naturalism, which provides a sense in which we can achieve epistemic normativity without norms.
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ISBN(s) 1403902879   9781403902870
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How Successful is Naturalism?Georg Gasser (ed.) - 2007 - Ontos Verlag.
What's Really Wrong with Laudan's Normative Naturalism.Jonathan Knowles - 2002 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (2):171 – 186.

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