The folk concept of intentionality

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 33:101-121 (1997)
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Abstract

When perceiving, explaining, or criticizing human behavior, people distinguish between intentional and unintentional actions. To do so, they rely on a shared folk concept of intentionality. In contrast to past speculative models, this article provides an empirically-based model of this concept. Study 1 demonstrates that people agree substantially in their judgments of intentionality, suggesting a shared underlying concept. Study 2 reveals that when asked to directly define the term intentional, people mention four components of intentionality: desire, belief, intention, and awareness. Study 3 confirms the importance of a fifth component, namely, skill. In light of these findings, the authors propose a model of the folk concept of intentionality and provide a further test in Study 4. The discussion compares the proposed model to past ones and examines its implications for social perception, attribution, and cognitive development.

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Author Profiles

Joshua Knobe
Yale University
Bertram F. Malle
Brown University

References found in this work

Practical reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1997 - In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), Review of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 431--63.
Two faces of intention.Michael Bratman - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.
Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions.Alfred Mele - 2001 - In Bertram Malle, L. J. Moses & Dare Baldwin (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. MIT Press. pp. 27--43.
Intentional action: Controversies, data, and core hypotheses.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):325-340.

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