Drawing on recent phenomenological discussions of collective intentionality and existential phenomenological accounts of agency, this article proposes a novel interpretation of shared action. First, I argue that we should understand action on the basis of how an environment pre-reflectively solicits agents to behave based on the affordances or goals inflected by their abilities and dispositions and their self-referential commitment to a project that is furthered by these affordances. Second, I show that this definition of action is sufficiently flexible to account for not only individual action and refer only to an individual) but also several distinct subtypes of shared action. My thesis is that behaviour counts as shared action if and only if it is caused by a solicitation in which either the goals, or the commitments, or both goals and commitments are joint, i.e., depend on several individuals. We thereby get three distinct subtypes of shared actions: jointly coordinated individually committed action, individually coordinated jointly committed action, and jointly coordinated jointly committed action.
Keywords collective intentionality  shared action  plural self-awareness  joint commitments  joint goals
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-021-09785-4
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