Phenomenology Without Conscious Access is A Form of Consciousness Without Top-down Attention

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):509-510 (2007)
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Abstract

We agree with Block's basic hypothesis postulating the existence of phenomenal consciousness without cognitive access. We explain such states in terms of consciousness without top-down, endogenous attention and speculate that their correlates may be a coalition of neurons that are consigned to the back of cortex, without access to working memory and planning in frontal cortex

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10.1017/s0140525x07002907

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Citations of this work

Consciousness cannot be separated from function.Michael A. Cohen & Daniel C. Dennett - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):358--364.
Phenomenal consciousness, attention and accessibility.Tobias Schlicht - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):309-334.

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Why visual attention and awareness are different.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):12-18.
Reflex Action.Franklin Fearing - 1931 - The Monist 41 (1):154-154.

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