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Phenomenology Without Conscious Access is A Form of Consciousness Without Top-down Attention
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):509-510 (2007)
Abstract
We agree with Block's basic hypothesis postulating the existence of phenomenal consciousness without cognitive access. We explain such states in terms of consciousness without top-down, endogenous attention and speculate that their correlates may be a coalition of neurons that are consigned to the back of cortex, without access to working memory and planning in frontal cortexAuthor Profiles
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Citations of this work
Consciousness cannot be separated from function.Michael A. Cohen & Daniel C. Dennett - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):358--364.
Phenomenal consciousness, attention and accessibility.Tobias Schlicht - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):309-334.
On a Confusion About Which Intuitions to Trust: From the Hard Problem to a Not Easy One.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):31-40.
References found in this work
Why visual attention and awareness are different.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):12-18.
Attention and consciousness: two distinct brain processes.Christof Koch & Naotsugu Tsuchiya - 2007 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (1):16-22.
Perceptual awareness and its loss in unilateral neglect and extinction.John Driver & Patrik Vuilleumier - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):39-88.
Spatial attention and two modes of visual consciousness.Syoichi Iwasaki - 1993 - Cognition 49 (3):211-233.
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