Rescuing the gorgias from Latour

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (4):395-422 (2006)
Abstract
Bruno Latour has been attempting to transform his sociological account of science into an ambitious theory of democracy. In a key early moment in this project, Latour alleges that Plato’s Gorgias introduces an impossibly ratio-nalistic and deeply anti-democratic philosophy which continues to this day to distort our understandings of science and democracy. Latour reckons that if he can successfully refute the Gorgias , then he will have opened up a space in which to authorize his own theory of democracy. I argue that Latour’s refutation of the Gorgias is a failure. Hence, his political theory is, by his own standards, horribly underdetermined. I present another reading of the Gorgias , and consider the dialogue’s possible relevance for current theories of deliberative democracy. Key Words: Latour • Gorgias • Socrates • rhetoric • elenchus • deliberative democracy.
Keywords Bruno Latour  Science  Democracy  Socrates  Gorgias
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DOI 10.1177/0048393106293377
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References found in this work BETA
Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens.Alastair Blanshard & J. Hesk - 2002 - Journal of Hellenic Studies 122:179.
Plato: Gorgias.I. G. Kidd & E. R. Dodds - 1961 - Philosophical Quarterly 11 (42):79.
The Open Society and Its Enemies.Karl R. Popper - 1955 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 6 (22):164-169.

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Philosophy, Kairosophy and the Lesson of Time.Marianna Papastephanou - 2014 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 46 (7):1-17.

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