Intrinsic and Instrumental Values

Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 68:71-74 (2018)
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Abstract

This paper concerns the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental goodness, and the claim that intrinsic goodness is somehow prior to instrumental goodness. Although the idea is ancient, one version of it going back at least to Aristotle, and although it may initially seem obvious, I suggest that its truth is not obvious at all. In fact, I try to make out a case for thinking that all goodness is fundamentally goal-oriented and contributory. It is goodness for an objective, in the sense of being adequate for, or such as to be successful at, realizing an end. Success in and of itself is an intrinsic good, but it is a rather special object of preference or desire: it is a second order case of goodness, having no content without actions which are directed at an end. The Aristotelian picture of intrinsic goodness being chosen for its own sake and more primary than instrumental good is a misleading picture of the situation.

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