American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):321-334 (2015)
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Abstract |
In some philosophical arguments an important role is played by the claim that certain situations differ from each other with respect to phenomenology. One class of such arguments are minimal pair arguments. These have been used to argue that there is cognitive phenomenology, that high-level properties are represented in perceptual experience, that understanding has phenomenology, and more. I argue that facts about our mental lives systematically block such arguments, reply to a range of objections, and apply my critique to some examples from the literature.
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Keywords | phenomenal contrast minimal pairs knowledge of consciousness |
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References found in this work BETA
Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 481--503.
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Citations of this work BETA
Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.
First-Person Experiments: A Characterisation and Defence.Brentyn Ramm - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9:449–467.
View all 18 citations / Add more citations
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