American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):321-334 (2015)

Authors
Ole Koksvik
Australian National University (PhD)
Abstract
In some philosophical arguments an important role is played by the claim that certain situations differ from each other with respect to phenomenology. One class of such arguments are minimal pair arguments. These have been used to argue that there is cognitive phenomenology, that high-level properties are represented in perceptual experience, that understanding has phenomenology, and more. I argue that facts about our mental lives systematically block such arguments, reply to a range of objections, and apply my critique to some examples from the literature.
Keywords phenomenal contrast  minimal pairs  knowledge of consciousness
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References found in this work BETA

The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
The Significance of Consciousness.Charles Siewert - 1998 - Princeton University Press.
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 481--503.
The Unity of Consciousness.Tim Bayne - 2010 - Oxford University Press UK.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Recent Issues in High-Level Perception.Grace Helton - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):851-862.
Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
First-Person Experiments: A Characterisation and Defence.Brentyn Ramm - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9:449–467.
VI-Gist!Tim Bayne - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (2):107-126.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

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