Three Models of Phenomenal Unity

Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):105-131 (2014)

Authors
Ole Koksvik
Australian National University (PhD)
Abstract
There is something it is like for me to hear a seagull crying, something it is like to see a boat in the distance, and something it is like to suffer a slight headache. Each of these local conscious experiences have their own phenomenal character. The experiences are phenomenally unified just in case there is also something it is like to enjoy these and all the other local experiences I have at the relevant time together. For there is also something it is like to be me overall: my global conscious experience has a phenomenal character. But what is it like to be me overall? What is the relationship between the phenomenal characters of local experiences and the phenomenal character of the global experience to which they contribute? This paper argues that our concepts of local and global conscious experiences allow for three completely different conceptions of how the former combine into the latter. It also argues that this shows that our concepts of local conscious experiences, global conscious experiences, and of their relationship are much more permissive than we might have thought
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 48,997
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Phenomenal Contrast: A Critique.Ole Koksvik - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):321-334.
The Phenomenology of Intuition.Ole Koksvik - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (1):e12387.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Phenomenal Concepts.Katalin Balog - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 292--312.
Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character.Fiona Macpherson - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Stirling
Phenomenal Concepts.Andreas Elpidorou - 2015 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
Factive Phenomenal Characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.
Explaining the Gap Intuition.Bruno Mölder - 2012 - In Oliver Petersen, Dagmar Borchers, Thomas Spitzley & Manfred Stöckler (eds.), Proceedings von GAP.7 Nachdenken Und Vordenken – Herausforderungen an Die Philosophie. Universität Duisburg-Essen. pp. 395-409.
The Representational Theory of Phenomenal Character: A Phenomenological Critique.Greg Janzen - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):321-339.
Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion.Uriah Kriegel - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):420-442.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-01-22

Total views
0

Recent downloads (6 months)
0

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

My notes

Sign in to use this feature