Authors
Niko Kolodny
University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
Munoz-Dardé (2009) argues that a social contract theory must meet Rousseau's 'liberty condition': that, after the social contract, each 'nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before'. She claims that Rousseau's social contract does not meet this condition, for reasons that suggest that no other social contract theory could. She concludes that political philosophy should turn away from social contract theory's preoccupation with authority and obedience, and focus instead on what she calls the 'legitimacy' of social arrangements. I raise questions about each of these claims.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2009.00178.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,436
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Leviathan.Thomas Hobbes - 1651 - Harmondsworth, Penguin.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-06-16

Total views
61 ( #189,093 of 2,520,357 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #406,012 of 2,520,357 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes