IX—How Does Coherence Matter?

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229-263 (2007)
Abstract
Recently, much attention has been paid to ‘rational requirements’ and, especially, to what I call ‘rational requirements of formal coherence as such’. These requirements are satisfied just when our attitudes are formally coherent: for example, when our beliefs do not contradict each other. Nevertheless, these requirements are puzzling. In particular, it is unclear why we should satisfy them. In light of this, I explore the conjecture that there are no requirements of formal coherence. I do so by trying to construct a theory of error for the idea that there are such requirements.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/pash.2007.107.issue-1pt3
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 32,696
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
How Does Coherence Matter?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.
The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.
Why Be Disposed to Be Coherent?Niko Kolodny - 2008 - Ethics 118 (3):437-463.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.
The Scope of Rational Requirements.John Brunero - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):28-49.
Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia.Edward Hinchman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):529-552.
Why Be Rational?Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Editorial.Julian Fink - 2013 - Organon F 20 (4):422-424.
State or Process Requirements?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):371-385.
Introduction to Agency Symposium.Christian Miller - 2008 - Ethics 118 (3):385-387.
Reasons and Rationality.Jonathan Way - forthcoming - In Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
Wide or Narrow Scope?John Broome - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):359-370.
Added to PP index
2017-02-21

Total downloads
3 ( #795,528 of 2,237,286 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #262,685 of 2,237,286 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature