IX—How Does Coherence Matter?

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229-263 (2007)
Niko Kolodny
University of California, Berkeley
Recently, much attention has been paid to ‘rational requirements’ and, especially, to what I call ‘rational requirements of formal coherence as such’. These requirements are satisfied just when our attitudes are formally coherent: for example, when our beliefs do not contradict each other. Nevertheless, these requirements are puzzling. In particular, it is unclear why we should satisfy them. In light of this, I explore the conjecture that there are no requirements of formal coherence. I do so by trying to construct a theory of error for the idea that there are such requirements.
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DOI 10.1111/pash.2007.107.issue-1pt3
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