In Wittgenstein and Hegel: Revaluation of Difference. Dresden: Technical University Dresden (2018)

David Kolb
Bates College
In the introduction to his Philosophy of Nature, Hegel speaks of metaphysics as “the entire range of the universal determinations of thought, as it were the diamond net into which everything is brought and thereby first made intelligible. Every educated consciousness has its metaphysics, an instinctive way of thinking”. Both Wittgenstein and Hegel see our many languages and forms of life as constituted by different diamond nets of categories/grammars. I argue that both Wittgenstein and Hegel take a non-reductive attitude toward this plurality of local ontologies, but that they disagree about what that plurality implies for history and philosophy. Their disagreements come in part from their differing choice of examples, influenced by atomism and holism. Even more, their disagreements stem from divergent notions about the structure and mode of being of those diamond nets. During the discussion, I distinguish three uses of the word “ontology”, and I ask each thinker about what might improve the other’s philosophical project.
Keywords Hegel  Wittgenstein  Ontology
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Cora Diamond and the Moral Imagination.Christopher Cordner & Andrew Gleeson - 2016 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 5 (1):55-77.
Whistling in 1929: Ramsey and Wittgenstein on the Infinite.S. J. Methven - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):651-669.
On a Tension in Diamond's Account of Tractarian Nonsense.Ben Vilhauer - 2003 - Philosophical Investigations 26 (3):230–238.
What Might Not Be Nonsense.Douglas G. Winblad - 1993 - Philosophy 68 (266):549 - 557.
Hegel’s Metaphysics.Joseph C. Flay - 1993 - The Owl of Minerva 24 (2):145-152.
Hegel’s Metaphysics.Joseph C. Flay - 1993 - The Owl of Minerva 24 (2):145-152.
The New Wittgenstein: A Critique.Ian Proops - 2001 - European Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):375–404.


Added to PP index

Total views
133 ( #86,747 of 2,499,399 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
25 ( #34,863 of 2,499,399 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes