Authors
Jason Konek
University of Bristol
Abstract
If chances are propensities, what reason do we have to expect them to be probabilities? I will offer a new answer to this question. It comes in two parts. First, I will defend an accuracy-centred account of what it is for a causal system to have precise propensities in the first place. Second, I will prove that, given some pretty weak assumptions about the nature of comparative causal dispositions, and some fairly standard assumptions about reasonable measures of inaccuracy, propensities must be probabilities.
Keywords propensities  probability  chance
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References found in this work BETA

A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
The Propensity Interpretation of Probability.Karl R. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):25-42.
Interpretations of Probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Varieties of Propensity.Donald Gillies - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):807-835.

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