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If chances are propensities, what reason do we have to expect them to be probabilities? I will offer a new answer to this question. It comes in two parts. First, I will defend an accuracy-centred account of what it is for a causal system to have precise propensities in the first place. Second, I will prove that, given some pretty weak assumptions about the nature of comparative causal dispositions, and some fairly standard assumptions about reasonable measures of inaccuracy, propensities must be probabilities.
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| Keywords | propensities probability chance |
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References found in this work BETA
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
The Propensity Interpretation of Probability.Karl R. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):25-42.
Varieties of Propensity.Donald Gillies - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):807-835.
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