Mind 128 (509):69-107 (2019)

Authors
Ben Levinstein
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Jason Konek
University of Bristol
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzw044
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References found in this work BETA

Intention.G. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Causation as Influence.David K. Lewis - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.

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Citations of this work BETA

Rational Endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.
A Pragmatist’s Guide to Epistemic Utility.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (4):613-638.
The Normative Status of Logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Stanford Enyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

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