Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):246–272 (2000)

Authors
Jeremy Koons
Georgetown University
Abstract
Much moral skepticism stems from the charge that moral facts do not figure in causal explanations. However, philosophers committed to normative epistemological discourse (by which I mean our practice of evaluating beliefs as justified or unjustified, and so forth) are in no position to demand that normative facts serve such a role, since epistemic facts are causally impotent as well. I argue instead that pragmatic reasons can justify our continued participation in practices which, like morality and epistemology, do not serve the function of causal explanation. Finally, I defend this pragmatic justification of morality and epistemology against a number of objections, including the objection that it confuses practical and theoretical justification.
Keywords morality  epistemology  explanation  fact  knowledge  normativity
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0114.00105
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Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind.Adam Morton - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (2):299.

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