Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):246-272 (2000)

Authors
Jeremy Koons
Georgetown University
Abstract
Much moral skepticism stems from the charge that moral facts do not figure in causal explanations. However, philosophers committed to normative epistemological discourse are in no position to demand that normative facts serve such a role, since epistemic facts are causally impotentas well. I argue instead that pragmatic reasons can justify our continued participation in practices which, like morality and epistemology, do not servethe function of causal explanation.
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DOI 10.1111/papq.2000.81.issue-3
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