Philosophy 76 (4):585-604 (2001)

Authors
Jeremy Koons
Georgetown University
Abstract
Many authors have argued that emotions serve an epistemic role in our moral practice. Some argue that this epistemic connection is so strong that creatures who do not share our affective nature will be unable to grasp our moral concepts. I argue that even if this sort of incommensurability does result from the role of affect in morality, incommensurability does not in itself entail relativism. In any case, there is no reason to suppose that one must share our emotions and concerns to be able to apply our moral concept successfully. Finally, I briefly investigate whether the moral realist can seek aid and comfort from Davidsonian arguments to the effect that incommensurability in ethics is in principle impossible, and decide that these arguments are not successful. I conclude that the epistemic role our emotions play in moral discourse does not relativize morality.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0031819101000584
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,920
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 1973 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47:5-20.
On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 286-298.
Phenomenalism.Wilfrid Sellars - 1963 - In Science, Perception, and Reality. Humanities Press. pp. 60-105.
Moral Relativism.David E. Cooper - 1978 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1):97-108.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Disentangling the Thick Concept Argument.Olle Blomberg - 2007 - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):63-78.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
51 ( #203,923 of 2,439,135 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #434,168 of 2,439,135 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes