Emotions and incommensurable moral concepts

Philosophy 76 (4):585-604 (2001)

Abstract

Many authors have argued that emotions serve an epistemic role in our moral practice. Some argue that this epistemic connection is so strong that creatures who do not share our affective nature will be unable to grasp our moral concepts. I argue that even if this sort of incommensurability does result from the role of affect in morality, incommensurability does not in itself entail relativism. In any case, there is no reason to suppose that one must share our emotions and concerns to be able to apply our moral concept successfully. Finally, I briefly investigate whether the moral realist can seek aid and comfort from Davidsonian arguments to the effect that incommensurability in ethics is in principle impossible, and decide that these arguments are not successful. I conclude that the epistemic role our emotions play in moral discourse does not relativize morality.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
54 (#214,161)

6 months
1 (#386,031)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jeremy Koons
Georgetown University

References found in this work

On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 1973 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47:5-20.
On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 286-298.
Phenomenalism.Wilfrid Sellars - 1963 - In Science, Perception, and Reality. Humanities Press. pp. 60-105.
Moral Relativism.David E. Cooper - 1978 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1):97-108.

Add more references

Citations of this work

Disentangling the Thick Concept Argument.Olle Blomberg - 2007 - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):63-78.

Add more citations