Progress in Complexity, Information, and Design 2 (3-3) (2003)
The historical association between functionalism and physicalism is not an unbreakable one. There are reasons for ﬁnding some version of a functional account of the mental attractive that are independent of the plausibility of physicalism. I develop a non-physicalist version of func- tionalism and explain how this model is able to secure genuine emergence of the mental, despite Kim’s arguments that such emergence theories are incoherent. The kind of teleological emergence of the mental required by this model is in fact fully compatible with the best available interpre- tations of physics and does not simply repeat the mistakes of vitalism. In addition, this model of teleological, emergent causation provides an attractive account of free/libertarian agency
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