Plantinga on properly basic belief in God: Lessons from the epistemology of perception

Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):839-850 (2011)

Authors
Jeremy Koons
Georgetown University
Abstract
Plantinga famously argues against evidentialism that belief in God can be properly basic. But the epistemology of cognitive faculties such as perception and memory which produce psychologically non-inferential beliefs shows that various inferentially justified theoretical beliefs are epistemically prior to our memory and perceptual beliefs, preventing the latter from being epistemically basic. Plantinga's analogy between the sensus divinitatis and these cognitive faculties suggests that the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis cannot be properly basic either. Objections by and on behalf of Plantinga to this argument are considered
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.709.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Essential Tension.T. S. Kuhn - 1977 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (4):359-375.
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
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``Is Belief in God Rational?&Quot.Alvin Plantinga - 1979 - In C. F. Delaney (ed.), Rationality and Religious Belief. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. pp. 7-27.
Atheism.Michael Martin - 1982 - Teaching Philosophy 5 (2):152-155.

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Recent Work in Reformed Epistemology.Andrew Moon - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):879-891.
Basic Beliefs and Christian Faith.Gregory W. Dawes - 2015 - Religious Studies 51 (1):61-74.

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