In Michael P. Wolf (ed.), Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. pp. 147-172 (2006)

Authors
Jeremy Koons
Georgetown University
Abstract
Recent critics of Sellars's argument against the Given attack Sellars's conclusion that sensations cannot play a role in the justification of observation beliefs. I maintain that Sellars can concede that sensations play a role in justifying observation reports without being forced to concede that they have the foundational status of an epistemic Given. However, Sellars's own arguments that observation reports rest, in some sense, on other empirical beliefs are not sufficiently well-developed; nor are his comments concerning internalism, which is crucial to his attack on the Given. As a result, both of these aspects of Sellars's epistemology have been attacked, and their significance has gone unrecognized by many philosophers. In this paper, I will try to fill in some of the missing pieces, so that we can see that not only are Sellars's theses concerning internalism and epistemic priority correct, but they represent a devastating attack on the Given, even if Sellars concedes that sensation can play a role in justifying observation beliefs. In short, we will see that these recent arguments in support of the Given have not succeeded in reviving it. The Given remains a myth
Keywords Epistemic  Givenness  Priority  Sellars, Wilfrid
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,795
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What is Justified Belief.Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?Laurence BonJour - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):1-14.

View all 14 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Sellars and the "Myth of the Given".William P. Alston - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):69-86.
Givenness and Explanatory Coherence.Wilfrid Sellars - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (October):612-624.
The Middle Does Not Hold.William A. Rottschaefer - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:361-369.
Wilfrid Sellars.Willem deVries - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Two Senses for 'Givenness of Consciousness'.Dorothée Legrand - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):89-94.
Cartesian Skepticism and the Epistemic Priority Thesis.Brian Ribeiro - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):573-586.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
28 ( #382,132 of 2,438,778 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #436,491 of 2,438,778 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes