Authors
Matthew Kopec
Northeastern University
Abstract
Margaret Gilbert has long defended the view that, roughly speaking, agents share the intention to perform an action if and only if they jointly commit to performing that action. This view has proven both influential and controversial. While some authors have raised concerns over the joint commitment view of shared intention, including at times offering purported counterexamples to certain aspects of the view, straightforward counterexamples to the view as a whole have yet to appear in the literature. Here we provide such counterexamples to show that joint commitment is neither necessary nor sufficient for shared intention.
Keywords Shared Intention  Joint Action  Joint Commitment  Margaret Gilbert  Michael Bratman
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DOI 10.26556/jesp.v13i2.250
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References found in this work BETA

Shared Cooperative Activity.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):327-341.
Shared Intention.Michael Bratman - 1993 - Ethics 104 (1):97-113.
Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon.Margaret Gilbert - 1990 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):1-14.

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Citations of this work BETA

Unifying Group Rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:517-544.

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