Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (3):271-289 (1997)

Abstract
The best-interests standard is a widely used ethical, legal, and social basis for policy and decision-making involving children and other incompetent persons. It is under attack, however, as self-defeating, individualistic, unknowable, vague, dangerous, and open to abuse. The author defends this standard by identifying its employment, first, as a threshold for intervention and judgment (as in child abuse and neglect rulings), second, as an ideal to establish policies or prima facie duties, and, third, as a standard of reasonableness. Criticisms of the best-interests standard are reconsidered after clarifying these different meanings
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/jmp/22.3.271
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,323
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Whose Harm? Which Metaphysic?Abram Brummett - 2019 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 40 (1):43-61.

View all 55 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Is Payment a Benefit?Alan Wertheimer - 2013 - Bioethics 27 (2):105-116.
Reasonable Women in the Law.Susan Dimock - 2008 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 11 (2):153-175.
Children and Bioethics: Uses and Abuses of the Best-Interests Standard.L. M. Kopelman - 1997 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (3):213-217.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-04-07

Total views
127 ( #83,808 of 2,448,718 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #72,259 of 2,448,718 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes