Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200 (2016)

Authors
Matthew Kopec
Northeastern University
Abstract
The Uniqueness Thesis holds, roughly speaking, that there is a unique rational response to any particular body of evidence. We first sketch some varieties of Uniqueness that appear in the literature. We then discuss some popular views that conflict with Uniqueness and others that require Uniqueness to be true. We then examine some arguments that have been presented in its favor and discuss why permissivists find them unconvincing. Last, we present some purported counterexamples that have been raised against Uniqueness and discuss some possible reasons why proponents of Uniqueness might find these similarly unconvincing
Keywords Uniqueness Thesis  Permissivism  Rational Uniqueness  Bayesianism  Epistemic Instumentalism  Disagreement
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1111/phc3.12318
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References found in this work BETA

Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.

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Citations of this work BETA

Interpretations of Probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Conditional Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 131-198.

View all 42 citations / Add more citations

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