Authors
Daniel Z. Korman
University of California at Santa Barbara
Dustin Locke
Claremont McKenna College
Abstract
Sometimes, learning about the origins of a belief can make it irrational to continue to hold that belief—a phenomenon we call ‘genealogical defeat’. According to explanationist accounts, genealogical defeat occurs when one learns that there is no appropriate explanatory connection between one’s belief and the truth. Flatfooted versions of explanationism have been widely and rightly rejected on the grounds that they would disallow beliefs about the future and other inductively-formed beliefs. After motivating the need for some explanationist account, we raise some problems for recent versions of explanationism. Learning from their failures, we then produce and defend a more resilient explanationism.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12848
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Thought.Gilbert H. Harman - 1973 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Oxford University Press.
Morality and Mathematics.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2020 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
A Causal Theory of Knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.

View all 42 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Higher-Order Defeat is Object-Independent.Joshua DiPaolo - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):248-269.
Process Reliabilism's Troubles with Defeat.Bob Beddor - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):145-159.
Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance.Clayton Litlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Mona Simion & Jessica Brown (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press.
Explanationist Evidentialism.Kevin McCain - 2013 - Episteme 10 (3):299-315.
Reasons Against Belief: A Theory of Epistemic Defeat.Tim Loughrist - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Explanationist Evidentialism and Awareness.Daniel Grosz - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (1):143-157.
Defeatism Defeated.Max Baker-Hytch & Matthew A. Benton - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):40-66.
Skeptical Thoughts Concerning Explanationism and Skepticism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1 (1):77-87.
Reasons, Justification, and Defeat.Mona Simion & Jessica Brown (eds.) - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons, Justification, and Defeat.Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.) - 2021 - Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-09-15

Total views
106 ( #102,778 of 2,454,447 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
106 ( #5,690 of 2,454,447 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes