An Explanationist Account of Genealogical Defeat

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):176-195 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Sometimes, learning about the origins of a belief can make it irrational to continue to hold that belief—a phenomenon we call ‘genealogical defeat’. According to explanationist accounts, genealogical defeat occurs when one learns that there is no appropriate explanatory connection between one’s belief and the truth. Flatfooted versions of explanationism have been widely and rightly rejected on the grounds that they would disallow beliefs about the future and other inductively-formed beliefs. After motivating the need for some explanationist account, we raise some problems for recent versions of explanationism. Learning from their failures, we then produce and defend a more resilient explanationism.

Similar books and articles

Higher-Order Defeat is Object-Independent.Joshua DiPaolo - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):248-269.
Process reliabilism's troubles with defeat.Bob Beddor - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):145-159.
Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance.Clayton Litlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2021 - In Mona Simion & Jessica Brown (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press. pp. 223–246.
Explanationist evidentialism.Kevin McCain - 2013 - Episteme 10 (3):299-315.
Reasons Against Belief: A Theory of Epistemic Defeat.Tim Loughrist - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Explanationist Evidentialism and Awareness.Daniel Grosz - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (1):143-157.
Defeatism Defeated.Max Baker-Hytch & Matthew A. Benton - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):40-66.
Skeptical Thoughts Concerning Explanationism and Skepticism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1 (1):77-87.
Reasons, Justification, and Defeat.Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.) - 2021 - Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-09-15

Downloads
699 (#20,180)

6 months
178 (#12,457)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Daniel Z. Korman
University of California at Santa Barbara
Dustin Locke
Claremont McKenna College

References found in this work

Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.
Debunking arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12):e12638.
A causal theory of knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.

View all 47 references / Add more references