Synthese 193 (1):145-166 (2016)

Abstract
According to a seminal paper by Barsalou , frames are attribute-value-matrices for representing exemplars or concepts. Frames have been used as a tool for reconstructing scientific concepts as well as conceptual change within scientific revolutions . In the frame-based representations of scientific concepts developed so far the semantic content of concepts is determined by a set of attribute-specific values. This way of representing semantic content works best for prototype concepts and defined concepts of a conceptual taxonomy satisfying the no-overlap principle. In addition to the semantic content of prototype concepts and defined concepts, frames can also contain empirical knowledge that is represented as constraints between the values of the frame. Beside prototype concepts and defined concepts, theoretical concepts that are multiply operationalized play an important role in science. However, so far no frame-based representation of theoretical concepts has been proposed. In this paper, it will be shown that theoretical concepts can be represented by frames and that frame-based representations of prototype concepts and defined concepts have another structure than frame-based representations of theoretical concepts. In order to explicate this difference, we will develop a frame-based method for representing all three kinds of concepts by means of mathematical graph-theory. One important consequence will be that the constraints of a frame representing a theoretical concept are entailed by the structure of the frame, as opposed to a frame representing defined or prototype concepts
Keywords Frame  Prototype concepts  Defined concepts  Theoretical concepts  Multiple operationalizations  Graph theory
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0750-0
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,089
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Introduction to Logic.Patrick Suppes - 1957 - New York, NY, USA: Dover Publications.
Testability and Meaning.Rudolf Carnap - 1936 - Philosophy of Science 3 (4):419-471.
The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts.R. Carnap - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1 (1):38--76.

View all 30 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Frames and Concepts in the Philosophy of Science.Stephan Kornmesser - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (2):225-251.
Determinables in Frames.David Hommen - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):291-310.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Theoretical Concepts of Sciences.Massoud Omid - unknown - Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 8.
Dealing with Concepts: From Cognitive Psychology to Knowledge Representation.Marcello Frixione & Antonio Lieto - 2013 - Frontiers of Psychological and Behevioural Science 2 (3):96-106.
Concepts and Cognitive Science.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 1999 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press. pp. 3-81.
Simple Concepts.Pavel Materna - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (3):295-319.
Concepts.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Capturing Dynamic Conceptual Frames.Rafal Urbaniak - 2010 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 18 (3):430-455.
Précis of Doing Without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611.
Is a Unified Account of Concepts Possible?James David Byrd - 2003 - Dissertation, University of California, Davis
Concepts and Theoretical Unification.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):219-220.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-05-13

Total views
73 ( #156,248 of 2,499,016 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #419,059 of 2,499,016 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes