A New Framework for Conceptualism

Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189 (2010)
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Abstract

Conceptualism is the thesis that, for any perceptual experience E, (i) E has a Fregean proposition as its content and (ii) a subject of E must possess a concept for each item represented by E. We advance a framework within which conceptualism may be defended against its most serious objections (e.g., Richard Heck's argument from nonveridical experience). The framework is of independent interest for the philosophy of mind and epistemology given its implications for debates regarding transparency, relationalism and representationalism, demonstrative thought, phenomenal character, and the speckled hen objection to modest foundationalism.

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Author Profiles

Enrico Grube
University of Innsbruck
John Bengson
University of Texas at Austin
Daniel Z. Korman
University of California at Santa Barbara