Belief in the Face of Controversy

In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford University Press (2010)

Hilary Kornblith
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
We often find that beliefs we hold are in conflict with the beliefs of epistemic peers, individuals who are just as intelligent, just as well-informed, and just as scrupulous in forming their beliefs as we are. Is it permissible to maintain our beliefs in the face of such disagreement? It is argued here that continued belief in these circumstances is not epistemically permissible, and that this has striking consequences for the practice of philosophy: we cannot reasonably hold on to our philosophical views.
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Philosophy Without Belief.Zach Barnett - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):109-138.
A Faithful Response to Disagreement.Lara Buchak - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):191-226.
Disagreement: What’s the Problem? Or A Good Peer is Hard to Find.Nathan L. King - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):249-272.

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