Emotion Review 6 (3):219-220 (2014)

Carolyn Korsmeyer
State University of New York, Buffalo
Barry Smith
State University of New York, Buffalo
In his The Meaning of Disgust, Colin McGinn employs elements of the phenomenological theory of disgust advanced by Aurel Kolnai in 1929. Kolnai’s treatment of what he calls “material” disgust and of its primary elicitors—putrefying organic matter, bodily wastes and secretions, sticky contaminants, vermin—anticipates more recent scientific treatments of this emotion as a mode of protective recoil. While Nina Strohminger charges McGinn with neglecting such scientific studies, we here attempt to show how Kolnai goes beyond experimental findings in his careful description of the phenomenological differences between disgust and other emotions of forceful disapproval.
Keywords Aurel Kolnai  Colin McGinn
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DOI 10.1177/1754073914523041
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References found in this work BETA

The Meaning of Disgust: A Refutation.Nina Strohminger - 2014 - Emotion Review 6 (3):214-216.
On Disgust.Aurel Kolnai - 2004 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (4):408-409.

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Citations of this work BETA

Disgust and Disease.Colin McGinn - 2015 - Emotion Review 7 (4):381-382.

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A Short Introduction to Aurel Kolnai’s Moral Philosophy.Chris Bessemans - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:203-232.
Moral Conflicts and Moral Awareness.Chris2 Bessemans - 2011 - Philosophy 86 (4):563-587.
The Meaning of the'Common Man'.Aurel Kolnai - 1949 - The Thomist 12 (3):272-335.


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