Naturalism and intuitions

Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):27-49 (2007)
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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between methodological naturalism and the standard practice within philosophy of constructing theories on the basis of our intuitions about imaginary cases, especially in the work of Alvin Goldman. It is argued that current work in cognitive science presents serious problems for Goldman's approach.

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Hilary Kornblith
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

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