Naturalism and intuitions

Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):27-49 (2007)
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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between methodological naturalism and the standard practice within philosophy of constructing theories on the basis of our intuitions about imaginary cases, especially in the work of Alvin Goldman. It is argued that current work in cognitive science presents serious problems for Goldman's approach.

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Hilary Kornblith
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Citations of this work

How (not) to react to experimental philosophy.Joachim Horvath - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):447-480.
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic intuitions.Jennifer Nagel - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):792–819.

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