Philosophy 89 (3):405-429 (2014)

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Abstract
You are the kind of entity for whom things can be good or bad. This is one of the most important facts about you. It provides you with the grounds for taking a passionate interest in your own life, for you are deeply concerned that things should go well for you. Presumably, you also want to do well, but that may be in part because you think that doing well is good for you, and that your life would be impoverished if you did not. But even if your interest in doing well is completely independent of any reference to your own condition, it probably depends on the thought that there are other entities, entities who are dependent upon you or affected by you, for whom things can be good or bad. It is only because there are entities like you, entities for whom things can be good or bad, that anything is important at all. If there were no entities for whom things can be good or bad, nothing would matter
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DOI 10.1017/s0031819114000102
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation.Jonathan Barnes - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 176 (4):493-494.
The Relational Nature of the Good.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8:1.

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A Trilemma for Teleological Individualism.John Basl - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1027-1029.
Subjectivism and Relational Good.Fritz-Anton Fritzson - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (2):359-370.

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