Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25 (1986)
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Abstract |
Content skepticism about practical reason is doubt about the bearing of rational considerations on the activities of deliberation and choice. Motivational skepticism is doubt about the scope of reason as a motive. Some people think that motivational considerations alone provide grounds for skepticism about the project of founding ethics on practical reason. I will argue, against this view, that motivational skepticism must always be based on content skepticism. I will not address the question of whether or not content skepticism is justified. I want only to establish the fact that motivational skepticism has no independent force.
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Keywords | Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy |
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ISBN(s) | 0022-362X |
DOI | 10.2307/2026464 |
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