Unrestricted Composition and Restricted Quantification

Philosophical Studies 140 (3):319-334 (2007)
Abstract
Many of those who accept the universalist thesis that mereological composition is unrestricted also maintain that the folk typically restrict their quantifiers in such a way as to exclude strange fusions when they say things that appear to conflict with universalism. Despite its prima facie implausibility, there are powerful arguments for universalism. By contrast, there is remarkably little evidence for the thesis that strange fusions are excluded from the ordinary domain of quantification. Furthermore, this reconciliatory strategy seems hopeless when applied to the more fundamental conflict between universalism and the intuitions that tell against it.
Keywords Composition  Folk  Ontology  Ontologese  Universalism
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Reprint years 2008
DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9147-3
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References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - Oxford University Press.

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Toward a Commonsense Answer to the Special Composition Question.Chad Carmichael - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):475-490.
The Argument From Vagueness.Daniel Z. Korman - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):891-901.

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