In David Rose (ed.), Experimental Metaphysics. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 187-206 (2017)

Authors
Chad Carmichael
Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis
Abstract
Rose and Schaffer (forthcoming) argue that teleological thinking has a substantial influence on folk intuitions about composition. They take this to show (i) that we should not rely on folk intuitions about composition and (ii) that we therefore should not reject theories of composition on the basis of intuitions about composition. We cast doubt on the teleological interpretation of folk judgments about composition; we show how their debunking argument can be resisted, even on the assumption that folk intuitions have a teleological source; and we argue that, even if folk intuitions about composition carry no weight, theories of composition can still be rejected on the basis of the intuitions of metaphysicians.
Keywords experimental philosophy  composition  intuition  teleology
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References found in this work BETA

Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Objects: Nothing Out of the Ordinary.Daniel Z. Korman - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.
Ordinary Objects.Amie Thomasson (ed.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Function Essentialism About Artifacts.Tim Juvshik - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.
Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12).
Against Conservatism in Metaphysics.Maegan Fairchild & John Hawthorne - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82:45-75.
Ordinary Objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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