Synthese 193 (9) (2016)

Michael Schippers
University of Oldenburg
Coherence is the property of propositions hanging or fitting together. Intuitively, adding a proposition to a set of propositions should be compatible with either increasing or decreasing the set’s degree of coherence. In this paper we show that probabilistic coherence measures based on relative overlap are in conflict with this intuitive verdict. More precisely, we prove that according to the naive overlap measure it is impossible to increase a set’s degree of coherence by adding propositions and that according to the refined overlap measure no set’s degree of coherence exceeds the degree of coherence of its maximally coherent subset. We also show that this result carries over to all other subset-sensitive refinements of the naive overlap measure. As both results stand in sharp contrast to elementary coherence intuitions, we conclude that extant relative overlap measures of coherence are inadequate
Keywords Bayesian coherentism  Probabilistic coherence measures   Relative overlap
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0887-x
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References found in this work BETA

Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Coherence Theory of Truth.Nicholas Rescher - 1973 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Measuring Coherence.Igor Douven & Wouter Meijs - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):405 - 425.
What is the Problem of Coherence and Truth?Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (5):246-272.

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Citations of this work BETA

Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Coherence and Common Causes: Against Relevance-Sensitive Measures of Coherence.Jakob Koscholke & Michael Schippers - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):771-785.

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Measuring Coherence.Igor Douven & Wouter Meijs - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):405 - 425.
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