Central place theory and the reciprocity between theory and evidence

Philosophy of Science 62 (4):581-598 (1995)

Abstract

Information about the prehistoric past is available only in the material remains. To be meaningful, these remains must be interpreted under the influence of a theory of some general or specific aspect of the past. For this reason, prehistoric archaeology clearly shows the reciprocity between theory and evidence and the tension between having to impose information on the evidence in order to discover information in the evidence. We use a specific case in the archaeology of Minoan Crete, a case that uses Central Place Theory as a guide to understanding the evidence, to demonstrate a coherence model of scientific knowledge

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Citations of this work

Theory-Ladenness of Evidence: A Case Study From History of Chemistry.Prajit K. Basu - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (2):351-368.

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