Defining Background Information: A Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence

Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 35 (2):297-304 (2018)
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Abstract

This paper discusses an aspect of the problem of old evidence which I call here the general problem of old evidence. The probability of old evidence is one or close to one, because background information K entails the evidence E or K consists of propositions which make E probable. In the literature, K is considered as a proposition relevant to E. Based on examples, I argue that K does not support the truth of E; instead, K supports the evidential status of E. I define background information as a set of propositions necessary and sufficient to consider E as the evidence of hypothesis H. Background information is relevant to the bearing of E on H, but not to the truth of E itself. My definition of background information implies that background information of E is probabilistically independent of E; that is, in the case of old evidence, neither P = 1, nor P ≈ 1.

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Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (3):498-500.
Bayesianism With A Human Face.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1983 - In John Earman (ed.), Testing Scientific Theories. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. pp. 133--156.
Subjective and objective confirmation.Patrick Maher - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (2):149-174.
Some problems for bayesian confirmation theory.Charles S. Chihara - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (4):551-560.

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