Legal Realism, Legal Interpretivism, Holmes and Nietzsche


Abstract
Two new legal philosophies took shape in the twentieth century, legal realism and legal interpretivism. Legal realists are skeptical of law and the legal reasoning done in courts. Ronald Dworkin’s philosophy, legal interpretivism, views legal reasoning as part of the coherent narrative that justifies the role of law in society. The realist movement is often traced to the philosophy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., whose thinking bears similarities to that of Friedrich Nietzsche. Taking Jerome Frank’s philosophy as the epitome of legal realism, I argue that Holmes and Nietzsche would prefer Dworkin’s legal interpretivism rather than Frank’s legal realism. This project illuminates the differences between Dworkin and Frank, as well as showing a realist lineage in Dworkin. This ultimately makes interpretivism a more palatable philosophy to Holmes and Nietzsche, who, when given a sympathetic exegesis, have more subtle, nuanced views of law
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 44,365
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On Legal Pragmatism: Where Does 'the Path of the Law' Lead Us?Susan Haack - 2005 - American Journal of Jurisprudence 50 (1):71-105.
Legal Realism & Judicial Decision-Making.Vitalius Tumonis - 2012 - Jurisprudencija: Mokslo darbu žurnalas 19 (4):1361-1382.
Why The Axioms and Theorems of Arithmetic Are Not Legal Norms.Matthew H. Kramer - 2007 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27 (3):555-562.
Between Natural Law and Legal Positivism: Dworkin and Hegel on Legal Theory.Thom Brooks - 2007 - Georgia State University Law Review 23 (3):513-60.
“A Short Genealogy of Realism”: Peirce, Kevelson and Legal Semiotics. [REVIEW]Geoffrey Sykes - 2008 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 21 (2):103-116.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-05-06

Total views
16 ( #530,227 of 2,271,741 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #564,635 of 2,271,741 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature