Erkenntnis 84 (6):1183-1188 (2019)

Abstract
Thomas Kroedel has recently proposed an interesting Pareto-style condition on permissible belief. Despite the condition’s initial plausibility, this paper aims at providing a counterexample to it. The example is based on the view that a proper condition on permissible belief should not give permission to believe a proposition that undermines one’s belief system or whose epistemic standing decreases in the light of one’s de facto beliefs.
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-018-0003-y
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