Theoria 54 (3):27-42 (2011)

Authors
Daniel Kostić
Radboud University Nijmegen
Abstract
This paper examines the explanatory gap account. The key notions for its proper understanding are analysed. In particular, the analysis is concerned with the role of “thick” and “thin” modes of presentation and “thick” and “thin” concepts which are relevant for the notions of “thick” and “thin” conceivability, and to that effect relevant for the gappy and non-gappy identities. The last section of the paper discusses the issue of the intelligibility of explanations. One of the conclusions is that the explanatory gap account only succeeds in establishing the epistemic gap. The claim that psychophysical identity is not intelligibly explicable, and thus opens the explanatory gap, would require an indepen- dent argument which would prove that intelligible explanations stem only from conceptual analysis. This, I argue, is not the case.
Keywords The explanatory gap   the epistemic gap  conceivability  intelligibility of explanation
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Vagueness Constraint and the Quality Space for Pain.Daniel Kostic - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):929-939.
Explanation and Understanding: An Alternative to Strevens’ D Epth.Angela Potochnik - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):29-38.
Explanation and the Explanatory Gap.Elanor Taylor - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):77-88.
Explanatory Depth.Brad Weslake - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):273-294.
Distinguishing Explanatory From Nonexplanatory Fictions.Alisa Bokulich - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (5):725-737.
Explanatory Fictions—for Real?Samuel Schindler - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1741-1755.
A Realist Theory of Understanding.John Marshall Bellwoar - 1997 - Dissertation, Brown University
Dissecting Explanatory Power.Petri Ylikoski & Jaakko Kuorikoski - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):201–219.
Against Explanatory Realism.Elanor Taylor - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):197-219.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-11-21

Total views
174 ( #66,302 of 2,497,818 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #39,059 of 2,497,818 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes