The Large-scale Structure of Scientific Method

Science & Education 18 (1):33-42 (2009)

Abstract

The standard textbook description of the nature of science describes the proposal, testing, and acceptance of a theoretical idea almost entirely in isolation from other theories. The resulting model of science is a kind of piecemeal empiricism that misses the important network structure of scientific knowledge. Only the large-scale description of scientific method can reveal the global interconnectedness of scientific knowledge that is an essential part of what makes science scientific. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V

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References found in this work

Patterns of Discovery.Norwood R. Hanson, A. D. Ritchie & Henryk Mehlberg - 1960 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (40):346-349.
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (3):498-500.
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Paul K. Moser - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (4):670-673.
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.James Van Cleve - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (2):272.

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