Reply to Israel on the New Riddle of Induction

Philosophia 40 (3):549-552 (2012)
Israel 2004 claims that numerous philosophers have misinterpreted Goodman’s original ‘New Riddle of Induction’, and weakened it in the process, because they do not define ‘grue’ as referring to past observations. Both claims are false: Goodman clearly took the riddle to concern the maximally general problem of “projecting” any type of characteristic from a given realm of objects into another, and since this problem subsumes Israel’s, Goodman formulated a stronger philosophical challenge than the latter surmises.
Keywords Nelson Goodman  grue  induction  Nicod's Criterion  confirmation  projectibility
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-011-9341-6
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References found in this work BETA
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
Induction, Conceptual Spaces and AI.Peter Gardenfors - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (1):78 - 95.
Natural Kinds.Willard V. Quine - 1969 - In Jaegwon Kim & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press. pp. 114-38.

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Evidence, Hypothesis, and Grue.Alfred Schramm - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):571-591.

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