Reasoning Without the Conjunction Closure

Episteme:1-14 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Some theories of rational belief assume that beliefs should be closed under conjunction. I motivate the rejection of the conjunction closure, and point out that the consequences of this rejection are not as severe as it is usually thought. An often raised objection is that without the conjunction closure people are unable to reason. I outline an approach in which we can – in usual cases – reason using conjunctions without accepting the closure in its whole generality. This solution is based on the notion of confidence levels, which can be defined using probabilities. Moreover, on this approach, reasoning has a scalable computational complexity adaptable to cognitive abilities of both rationally bounded and perfectly rational agents. I perform a simulation to assess its error rate, and compare it to reasoning with conjunction closure.

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Alicja Kowalewska
Carnegie Mellon University

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References found in this work

Probability and the logic of rational belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, Conn.,: Wesleyan University Press.
The paradox of the preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.
``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.
Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.

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