The elements of rationality and chance in the choice of human action

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 34 (4):353–374 (2004)
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Abstract

The focus in this paper is on deliberate human action. The central questions addressed are: whether purely rational choice is possible; whether choices may be induced by chance alone; or whether there is always a mixture of rationality and chance, as well as other factors such as habit, emotion, imitation and irrationality. The approach is a factualist one, upholding the view that, although human action can be explained by its antecedents, this is not incompatible with the notion of "free choice". It is the actual choosing process that determines the final choice of action. Whatever the sources of the elements involved in the choosing process, the choice of action is a specific outcome created by the acting agent. It is in this choosing process and decision making that both rationality and chance enter. The conclusion is that rationality is the element which links intentionality with goal seeking and attainment, but that the actual choice is determined by a complex interactive process in which both logic and chance play a part.

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