Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):150 – 157 (1980)
The technical apparatus of modal semantics--Possible worlds, World-Lines, Counterparts, Etc.--Continues to arouse suspicion among philosophers of various persuasions. A way to dispel at least some of the suspicion is to provide a naturalistic interpretation of the semantical machinery. My goal here is precisely that. More specifically, I provide a behavioristically acceptable interpretation of david lewis' counterpart theory. Reference to worlds and counterparts is construed in sober, Quinean terms. The result is a "metalinguistic" construal of counterpart semantics, And thus, Of modality. Having shown that counterpart theory rests on no dubious philosophical assumptions, I briefly explore some of the metaphysical consequences of the resulting theory of modality
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References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic.David K. Lewis - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):113-126.
Citations of this work BETA
Modal Realism with Modal Tense 1.Takashi Yagisawa - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):309-327.
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