Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27 (2):281-310 (2007)

Hillel Steiner
University of Manchester
Matthew Henry Kramer
Cambridge University
Some important recent articles, including one in this journal, have sought to devise theories of rights that can transcend the longstanding debate between the Interest Theory and the Will Theory. The present essay argues that those efforts fail and that the Interest Theory and the Will Theory withstand the criticisms that have been levelled against them. To be sure, the criticisms have been valuable in that they have prompted the amplification and clarification of the two dominant theories of rights; but their upshot has been to reveal the need for the improvement, rather than the abandonment, of those theories
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DOI 10.1093/ojls/gqi039
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Rights.Leif Wenar - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
XI—Why is It Disrespectful to Violate Rights?Rowan Cruft - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (2pt2):201-224.
Beyond Normative Control: Against the Will Theory of Rights.Joseph Bowen - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):427-443.
On Prepositional Duties.Tim Hayward - 2013 - Ethics 123 (2):264-291.

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