Metaphysica 19 (2):251-257 (2018)

Authors
Nils Kürbis
University of Lodz
Abstract
Molnar argues that the problem of truthmakers for negative truths arises because we tend to accept four metaphysical principles that entail that all negative truths have positive truthmakers. This conclusion, however, already follows from only three of Molnar´s metaphysical principles. One purpose of this note is to set the record straight. I provide an alternative reading of two of Molnar´s principles on which they are all needed to derive the desired conclusion. Furthermore, according to Molnar, the four principles may be inconsistent. By themselves, however, they are not. The other purpose of this note is to propose some plausible further principles that, when added to the four metaphysical theses, entail a contradiction.
Keywords Negation  Falsity  Truth  Truthmakers  Correspondence
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Reprint years 2018
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DOI 10.1515/mp-2018-0014
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References found in this work BETA

A World of States of Affairs.D. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
A World of States of Affairs.[author unknown] - 1997 - Philosophy 74 (287):130-134.
Truthmakers for Negative Truths.George Molnar - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):72 – 86.
A World of States of Affairs.[author unknown] - 1999 - Noûs 33 (3):473-495.
Negative Truths From Positive Facts.Colin Cheyne & Charles Pigden - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):249 – 265.

View all 14 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

An Argument for Minimal Logic.Nils Kürbis - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):31-63.
Is Incompatibilism Compatible with Fregeanism?Nils Kürbis - 2018 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 14 (2):27-46.

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