Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (2019)

Authors
Nils Kürbis
University of Lodz
Abstract
This book argues that the meaning of negation, perhaps the most important logical constant, cannot be defined within the framework of the most comprehensive theory of proof-theoretic semantics, as formulated in the influential work of Michael Dummett and Dag Prawitz. Nils Kürbis examines three approaches that have attempted to solve the problem - defining negation in terms of metaphysical incompatibility; treating negation as an undefinable primitive; and defining negation in terms of a speech act of denial - and concludes that they cannot adequately do so. He argues that whereas proof-theoretic semantics usually only appeals to a notion of truth, it also needs to appeal to a notion of falsity, and proposes a system of natural deduction in which both are incorporated. Offering new perspectives on negation, denial and falsity, his book will be important for readers working on logic, metaphysics and the philosophy of language.
Keywords Falsity  Negation  Proof Theoretic Semantics  Denial  Incompatibility
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Reprint years 2021
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ISBN(s) 9781108481304   1108481302   9781108716727   1108716725
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Citations of this work BETA

Is Incompatibilism Compatible with Fregeanism?Nils Kürbis - 2018 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 14 (2):27-46.
Sketch of a Proof-Theoretic Semantics for Necessity.Nils Kürbis - 2020 - In Nicola Olivetti, Rineke Verbrugge & Sara Negri (eds.), Advances in Modal Logic 13. Booklet of Short Papers. Helsinki: pp. 37-43.

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