A Capacity to Get Things Right: Gilbert Ryle on Knowledge

European Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):25-46 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Gilbert Ryle's distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that faces a significant challenge: accounting for the unity of knowledge. Jason Stanley, an ‘intellectualist’ opponent of Ryle's, brings out this problem by arguing that Ryleans must treat ‘know’ as an ambiguous word and must distinguish knowledge proper from knowledge-how, which is ‘knowledge’ only so-called. I develop the challenge and show that underlying Ryle's distinction is a unified vision of knowledge as ‘a capacity to get things right’, covering both knowledge-how and knowledge-that. I show how Ryle specifies the general notion into knowledge-how and knowledge-that and discuss the mutual interdependence exhibited by the two forms of knowledge. Ryle's positive view of knowledge, properly understood, emerges as an important, neglected, alternative which should be brought back into the ongoing conversation about practical and theoretical knowledge.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 86,412

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A Capacity to Get Things Right: Gilbert Ryle on Knowledge.Michael Kremer - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):799-816.
Ryle on Knowing How and the Possibility of Vocational Education.Christopher Winch - 2009 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (1):88-101.
Ryle on knowing how and the possibility of vocational education.Christopher Winch - 2009 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (1):88-101.
Knowing How, Knowing That, Knowing Technology.Per Norström - 2015 - Philosophy and Technology 28 (4):553-565.
Swimming and speaking spanish.Patricia Hanna - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (3):267-285.
Knowing how and knowing that: A distinction reconsidered.Paul Snowdon - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):1–29.
Knowledge-How (Reference Entry).Bolesław Czarnecki - 2016 - Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy.
Ideology and Knowledge-How.Michael Kremer - 2016 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 31 (3):295-311.
Is knowing-how simply a case of knowing-that?Tobias Rosefeldt - 2004 - Philosophical Investigations 27 (4):370–379.


Added to PP

69 (#202,793)

6 months
3 (#340,008)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Kremer
University of Chicago

Citations of this work

Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Knowing How.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):487-503.
Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):86-104.
The puzzle of learning by doing and the gradability of knowledge‐how.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):619-637.

View all 32 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Logical investigations.Edmund Husserl - 2000 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Dermot Moran.
Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
Action, Knowledge, and Will.John Hyman - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Knowing.Jason Stanley - 2010 - Noûs 45 (2):207-238.
How knowledge works.John Hyman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):433-451.

View all 12 references / Add more references