Comparing fixed-point and revision theories of truth

Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (4):363-403 (2009)
Abstract
In response to the liar’s paradox, Kripke developed the fixed-point semantics for languages expressing their own truth concepts. Kripke’s work suggests a number of related fixed-point theories of truth for such languages. Gupta and Belnap develop their revision theory of truth in contrast to the fixed-point theories. The current paper considers three natural ways to compare the various resulting theories of truth, and establishes the resulting relationships among these theories. The point is to get a sense of the lay of the land amid a variety of options. Our results will also provide technical fodder for the methodological remarks of the companion paper to this one.
Keywords Fixed-point theory  Revision theory  Truth
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10992-009-9107-9
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,803
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul A. Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Philosophy of Logics.Susan Haack - 1978 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
How Truth Behaves When There's No Vicious Reference.Philip Kremer - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (4):344 - 367.
How Truth Behaves When There’s No Vicious Reference.Philip Kremer - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (4):345-367.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
65 ( #83,928 of 2,202,717 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #97,530 of 2,202,717 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature