How Truth Behaves When There’s No Vicious Reference

Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (4):345-367 (2010)
Authors
Philip Kremer
University of Toronto, St. George
Abstract
In The Revision Theory of Truth (MIT Press), Gupta and Belnap (1993) claim as an advantage of their approach to truth "its consequence that truth behaves like an ordinary classical concept under certain conditions—conditions that can roughly be characterized as those in which there is no vicious reference in the language." To clarify this remark, they define Thomason models, nonpathological models in which truth behaves like a classical concept, and investigate conditions under which a model is Thomason: they argue that a model is Thomason when there is no vicious reference in it. We extend their investigation, considering notions of nonpathologicality and senses of "no vicious reference" generated both by revision theories of truth and by fixedpoint theories of truth. We show that some of the fixed-point theories have an advantage analogous to that which Gupta and Belnap claim for their approach, and that at least one revision theory does not. This calls into question the claim that the revision theories have a distinctive advantage in this regard.
Keywords Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10992-010-9136-4
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 36,586
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul A. Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Paradox Without Self-Reference.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):251.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-9.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Name-Bearing, Reference, and Circularity.Aidan Gray - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):207-231.
Truth and Some Relativists.Eddy M. Zemach - 1987 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 29:1-11.
Truth, Reference, and Realism.Zsolt Novák & András Simonyi (eds.) - 2010 - Central European University Press.
Are Truth and Reference Quasi-Disquotational?Ray Buchanan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (1):43 - 75.
Reality Without Reference.D. Davidson - 1977 - Dialectica 31 (1):247--53.
If Logic, Definitions and the Vicious Circle Principle.Jaakko Hintikka - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):505-517.
Truth as Translation – Part A.Hannes Leitgeb - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (4):281-307.
Davidson on Truth and Reference.Kim Sterelny - 1981 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):95-116.
A Semantical Account of the Vicious Circle Principle.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1979 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (3):595-598.
Consciousness and Self-Reference.Arthur E. Falk - 1995 - Erkenntnis 43 (2):151-80.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-06-19

Total downloads
50 ( #131,620 of 2,303,776 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #273,839 of 2,303,776 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature